Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. www.erudit.org Tout droit réservé © Canadian Science and Technology Historical Association / Association pour l'histoire de la science et de la technologie au Canada, 1981 In meeting military transport needs in the Canadas prior to the War of 1812, the Ordnance Department had simply made use of the existing mode of transport on the Saint Lawrence where bateaux were employed on the navigable stretches of the river and ox carts and wagons were hired to haul cargoes over the portages at the rapids. The French-Canadian bateau adopted by the military was basically a flat-bottoired skiff with pointed ends and almost perpendicular sides. It measured forty feet long by six feet wide, and was capable of carrying five tons of cargo with a draught of only twenty inches.
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Each bateau was equipped with oars, setting poles, and a single square sail by which the crew of four and a tillerman worked it across the lakes and upstream against the strong currents of the Saint Lawrence River. The bateau had proved ideally suited to a turbulent river navigation as it was almost impossible to capsize, 3 and had the shallow draught characteristic of the canoe while being able to withstand the hard knocks received in being worked up through rock-strewn rapids.^ On the Saint Lawrence transport system, all of the heavy freight going up river had to be carted overland eight miles from Montréal to Lachine to avoid the Lachine Rapids. The bateaux were loaded at Lachine from where they were capable of passing by wa ter all of the way to Kingston on Lake Ontario. However, this was no easy task. On the upper Saint Lawrence there were three relatively long, quiet stretches of water where the bateaux could proceed by oar or sail; but these were separated by two approximately nine-mile-long stretches of rapids where the river narrowed appreciably and the water ran so fast and furiously that the bateaux, despite having a sufficient depth of water to ascend, were unable to make any headway. At the base of each series of rapids the cargoes had to be transhipped by ox carts while the lightened bateaux were slowly and la boriously worked upwards with setting poles and, on occasion, by the crewmen plunging into water up to their armpits to pull on tow ropes. This work was relieved only by the em ployment of oxen to tow the bateaux where a sufficient depth of water was found close enough to shore to permit their employment. Once clear of the upper rapids, the bateaux were fully loaded to sail the last sixty-seven miles to Kingston where they would arrive anywhere from eleven to fourteen days after leaving Lachine, some 120 miles down stream. 5 on the return voyage, the bateaux were able to shoot the rapids reaching Lachine in three to four days.6
The Saint Lawrence transport system had functioned reason ably well in the pre-war period; but with the coming of war, unprecedented heavy transport demands were made which altered the situation dramatically. In wartime, all of the ordnance, munitions, equipment and rations required to main tain an army in Upper Canada had to be imported and conveyed up the Saint Lawrence by bateaux.
Upper Canada was but thinly populated, with the bulk of its population living by a subsistence agriculture which was unable to provide much of a food surplus at any time, and with the militia called out on active duty, there was no possibility of supporting the army on local resources as was the case where armies were deployed in older more settled areas. 8 Moreover, as of 1813, the American and British forces fighting on the Upper Canadian frontiers had commenced a shipbuilding war for naval supremacy on Lake Ontario which required the Ordnance Department to convey up the Saint Lawrence all tjie heavy long guns, anchors and ship cables required to equip the warships of up to 100 guns that the Royal Navy was con structing at the Kingston dockyard.9
Both the Americans and the British experienced severe trans port problems in maintaining their respective armies on the frontiers of Upper Canada, so much so that logistics had determined the course of the struggle. As the war pro gressed, both sides came to recognize the critical impor tance of logistics, and the shipbuilding race for naval supremacy on Lake Ontario was but a natural response to this factor in an area where through roads were either non existent or incapable of transporting heavy ordnance and stores.^-0 Where logistics were concerned, the British forces were at a decided disadvantage. Not only did all of their regular troops, ordnance and supplies have to be im ported from England by way of the torturously slow, dif ficult and costly Saint Lawrence communication, but that supply line -and its Lake Ontario extension -lay ex posed along the whole of the fighting front as opposed to the American supply lines which ran back into the interior. ^ Faced with increasingly-heavy transport demands on the Saint Lawrence, the Ordnance Department had responded by increasing the capacity of the existing system. The pre war bateaux establishment of twenty-five vessels was in creased to the point where, at the height of the war, 200 bateaux a week were proceeding up river, and farmers with their ox carts were being called out on corvée from as far as thirty miles distance from Lachine to man the portages. In 1814, 10,000 men were employed in the transport system, including 3,500 bateauxmen, 12 and the Ordnance Department had to expend £341,215 to keep the system in operation, roughly triple the cost of the system in the first year of the war.13 Despite such enormous expenditures, manpower shortages developed in 1814 which made it clear that the capacity of the existing system could not be increased fur ther or even sustained at its 1814 level. 14 Consequently, plans were formed to render the transport system more ef ficient by removing rocks that obstructed the water passage in the rapids close to shore, constructing a shallow bateaux canal between Montréal and Lachine, and employing Durham boats, which had a greater carrying capacity than bateaux, on the long stretches of open water between the rapids of the Saint Lawrence. 15 But when it was learned that the Americans planned to cut the Saint Lawrence com munication, the British military authorities immediately began to search for ways in which an alternative supply route to Upper Canada might be developed independent of the Saint Lawrence. The first proposal considered came from Lieut.-Col. Macdonnel, a Canadian serving with the British Army on the Saint Lawrence front.
In November 1814, Macdonnel had proposed that an alternative water communication might be opened by linking together a number of rivers and small lakes on the Lake Ontario water shed to the rear of Kingston, with waters flowing into the Rideau River on the Ottawa River watershed so that bateaux, if they ascended the existing Ottawa River navigation to the rear of Montréal, could pass through the interior ofUpper Canada to Kingston independent of the Saint Lawrence.1
Only a handful of settlers was scattered throughout this vast wilderness area about which compara tively little was known; but Macdonnel, after reconnoitering the proposed route in December 1814, reported that a bateaux navigation could be developed by connecting up the headwaters of the Rideau and Cataraqui rivers. What Macdonnel had in mind was the improvement of the natural river navigations in conjunction with haulover portages to connect up the separate bodies of navigable water. These works, he believed, could readily be constructed at a mini mal cost to make a workable bateaux communication;
1 ' but not everyone agreed that a bateaux communication so formed would prove all that viable.
After perusing the Macdonnel plan in January 1815, Robert Nichol, the Quartermaster-General of Militia, noted that the great number and extent of the portages to be traversed would result in intolerable delays and require the employ-. ment of such a large and costly working establishment as would prove impossible to sustain in a wilderness. He cal culated that the ten portages alone would take eleven days to traverse, exclusive of the time spent on the river navi gations between the portages. Furthermore, Nichol felt that if the proposed Rideau navigation were to meet wartime transport demands, it would have to be capable of passing up to sixteen bateaux a day with their lading across each of its portages, and this would require an establishment of as many as 1700 yoke of oxen to make the system work effectively. Such a large establishment would be difficult to procure, even if money were no object; but what rendered the whole system totally impracticable in Nichol 1 s judgment was the lack of forage for draught animals in the heavilyforested Rideau interior. 
In the interim, discharged soldiers and their families were settled in the wilderness interior of the Rideau at Perth (after 1816), Richmond (after 1818) and Lanark (after 1820), to serve as nuclei for new settlements which would supply the labour, forage, and draught animals required to construct and operate a bateaux navigation, as well as provide trained militia units for its defence. It was hoped that the military settlements would foster an in creasing trade which eventually would encourage the provin cial government to undertake, or at least contribute sub stantially towards, the cost of constructing a proper canal through the Rideau interior.21 The settlers were also en couraged to open roads through the forest to connect the new military settlements with the major water communica tions of the Ottawa River to the east and with Lake Ontario to the southwest at Kingston.
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The construction of roads by settlers in Upper Canada, however, was never regarded as a viable alternative to the construction of a canal, and with good reason.
In the early period of settlement in Upper Canada, roads were not used extensively for transport outside of the win ter months and, indeed, there was not much demand for heavy transport communications where subsistence farming was the norm and local communities were largely self sufficient. When heavy transport was needed, farmers either resorted to water carriage where that was available or waited until the winter months to do their heavy hauling by sleigh or sled. In winter, a snow-covered road, regardless of its summer condition, provided an excellent highway along which farmers could haul their crops to mill at any distance. In such circumstances, the farmers had little interest in improving roads when all that was necessary to effect a winter road was to clear a right-of-way through the trees.
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The socalled roads opened by the settlers in the Rideau corridor were, in effect, either mere bridle and bush paths, or roads which, although wide enough for a wagon, were cluttered with stumps, rocks and bogs that rendered them impassable for weeks on end during wet seasons of the year.
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With the general lack of ditches, 25 and the high trees excluding the wind, these forest roads were seldom dry.
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Corduroy roads were being constructed in the older, settled areas of the province at this time; but they provided at best a torturously slow and rough passage for horse and wagon, and such roads quickly broke up under heavy use.
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Even if good roads could have been constructed, it was well known that heavy goods could be transported by water at one-twenty-fifth the cost of land carriage; 28 
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When Lower Canada was about to undertake such a canal, however, the Admiralty insisted that it be constructed on a larger scale than envisaged by the Ordnance Department.
As early as 1816, the British Admiralty had recommended that the proposed Lachine Canal should be large enough not only to enable Durham boats to be towed through, but also the gunboats which had been used to protect convoys of bateaux on the navigable stretches of the Saint Lawrence during the war, and small steam tugs which the Admiralty hoped would eventually be employed on the inland lakes and rivers of the Canadas.**" Gunboats, propelled by oars and sail, were up to sixty-four feet long, with a sixteen-foot breadth of beam, and a four-feet, nine-inch draught.
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The steam tugs in contemplation must have been somewhat larger for, by 1819, it was decided to construct the Lachine Canal with locks 108 feet long by twenty feet wide with up to five feet of water on the sills.
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This scale of canal lock was thereafter adopted for the Grenville Canal already under construction. 4 2 Where the Rideau waterway was con cerned, no decision was taken as to the scale of canal to be constructed pending the completion of an Upper Canadian inquiry.
In 1823-24, the legislature of Upper Canada employed a civil engineer, Samuel Clowes, to survey and report on the poten tial cost and feasibility of constructing a number of canals in the province, including the proposed Rideau communica tion. Clowes reported in September 1824 that the construc tion of an uninterrupted canal from Kingston to the Ottawa River was possible by the Rideau Lake route; but a Durham boat canal, with a depth of five feet to enable the draught of these vessels to be increased, would cost £145,802.
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This sum ranged far beyond anything that had been contem plated hitherto and, at this juncture, the Colonial Office, which had been assiduously promoting the settlement of the Rideau corridor while trying to induce the provincial legis lature to undertake the construction of a canal, turned to consider another mode of transport which appeared potentially less costly to construct.
In December 1824, James George, a forwarder on the Saint Lawrence, patented a novel method of constructing wooden portage railways 44 and tried to form a company to undertake the improvement of the Saint Lawrence navigation. He in tended to establish a sloop navigation between Montréal and Kingston by blasting rocks impeding the river channels, con structing portage railways to carry laden sloops around im passable rapids and employing steamboats to tow the vessels on the river and up through the deeper rapids where strong currents had hitherto prevented boats propelled by oar, pole or sail from ascending. According to George's specifications, the track of his rail way was to be formed of grooved, rough-hewn logs with iron strapping on a gauge matching the carts and wagons in common use, and on which cradles capable of carrying ves sels of varying hull dimensions were to be drawn. Horses were to provide the motive power on most of the system, but on steep inclines, a double track was to be constructed with a stationary steam engine positioned at the crest to operate an endless chain by which one cradle or wagon could ascend while another descended.49 George claimed that his railway could be constructed using materials and tools readily at hand for only £10 per mile which meant, if his cost calculations were correct,50 that a railway from the Ottawa River to Kingston would cost as little as £1,250 ex clusive of the operating equipment. Although George's projected railway was of a seemingly primitive nature, the materials to be employed in its con struction were by no means outmoded in terms of the state of advancement of North American railway building technol ogy. In England, Jessup's cast iron edge rail, in its twofoot, six-inch lengths, had long since been the standard form of track which was only beginning to be superseded by the twenty-foot lengths of wrought iron rail that Birkenshaw, as of 1820, had succeeded in producing by rolling;51 but iron rails were unknown in North America. The several short tramways constructed in the United States prior to 1825 had solid wooden rails and, in the following year, a three-mile-long Boston tramway was the first in North America to use wooden rails capped with strips of flat iron.
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Solid iron rails were not to be introduced into American railway construction until 1835, and into Canadian railway construction until still a decade later.
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In North America, around 1825, wooden rails with iron strapping were, if anything, advanced rather than an ar chaic form of railway construction and, likewise, George's proposal to use horsepower and stationary steam engines rather than steam traction was in keeping with the most re liable power system developed for railways to that date.
In England, Richard Trevithick had employed a steam loco motive in hauling a ten-ton load over a colliery tramway as early as 1804, 54 but subsequent efforts to employ steam locomotives on tramways had attained only a limited success marred by frequent breakdowns, steaming problems and an inadequate rail-making technology which severely limited their efficiency and effective range of operation.
55
By the 1820s, English railway engineers were, for the most part, convinced that the employment of horsepower on long, level stretches of railways in conjunction with stationary steam engines on short, steep inclines -where hills could not be readily avoided -was the most efficient and reli able system of operating a railway.
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Indeed, by 1825, this had become the standard approach to the construction and operation of English railways.
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The steam locomotive was not able to establish a marked superiority over horse power until October 1829 when Robert Stephenson's Rock&t, equipped with the newly-developed multi-tubular boiler and an exhaust-induced draught, was able to draw a fortyfour ton load a total distance of seventy miles back and forth without difficulty. After reconnoitering the river systems of the Canadas, the Smyth Commission reported in September 1825 that uninterrupted canals, on a scale suf ficient to enable gunboats to circulate freely through the whole of the military transport system, were, from a mili tary standpoint, superior to railways. Canals were by far the most economical means of transport as one horse could draw twenty-five tons on a canal, but only five tons with ease on a railway, and in the Canadas canals could be used almost year round. In winter, once the ice hardened, sleds loaded with any bulk of weight could be readily drawn along their surface, whereas the operation of railways would be severely restricted, if not prevented altogether, by the severity of the climate and the heavy snowfall.**" This was a widely-held belief in the Canadas where, as in the Rideau corridor, winter temperatures could range as low as -32°F. for days on end and the snowfall could reach up to fifteen feet in near-record years.
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By contrast, the potential use of canals as a winter transport system was readily per ceived by the Smyth Commission as the transport of heavy bulk freight over the ice of winter 'river roads,' a Canadian tradition. In view of the suspected difficulty, if not impossibility, of operating railways during the long Canadian winter, the commissioners concluded that railways were not suited to serve as major transport arteries in the Canadas and that they should be employed only in situations where great weights had to be transported over very short distances in the absence of sufficient water to construct a canal.
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In their view, canals were also cheaper to con struct than railways.
The Smyth Commission reported that whereas a canal four feet deep by twenty feet wide could be excavated for an expendi ture of £1,860 per mile, a railway would cost up to £3,000 to construct. Moreover, a canal could step directly up steep slopes where sufficient water was available, but a railway could not be constructed for horse-drawn wagons with an angle of ascent greater than one degree, or a ninety-two feet rise in a mile. This meant that in hilly country a railway might well have to be routed over three times as great a distance as a canal. Taking this compara tive distance factor into account, the commission calculated that the extra distance a railway would have to be construc ted to overcome hilly terrain was roughly equal to the cost of constructing locks to overcome the same difference of elevation on a direct line and, therefore, canals were £1,140 per mile cheaper to construct than railways based on a simple comparison of the cost of excavation versus that of building a railway.63
Where railways and canals were concerned, the Smyth Commis sion based its assessment of construction costs on contem porary British experience. No report was made on the feasi bility of James George's novel scheme for building railways nor were his cost calculations taken into account. 64 
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The Ordnance Department, although in agreement with By as to the immense commercial and military advantages to be gained by such a steamboat navigation, nonetheless turned his recommendation down on the grounds that steamboats would be unable to operate on canals, and that the towing of steamboats through an extensive canal system was of no real advantage. Moreover, the construction of the Rideau Canal with large locks would have little utility if the other canals were not similarly enlarged, and to construct locks of such a size through the whole system would entail enormous costs, probably far beyond what By had in contem plation.
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Leaving aside the question of cost, which dic tated heavily against By 1 s scheme, there was much to be said in favour of the Ordnance's decision based on the situation as it was perceived from England. Despite their unquestioned success on the rivers of the British Isles and North America, steamboats were not used on canals. In Great Britain, a number of experiments had been tried in operating steamboats on canals, but with very discouraging results. In every case the churning of the paddle wheels destroyed the banks, and experience had shown that the only effectual response was either to protect the banks by walling and/or pavingwhich was prohibitively expensive -or to eliminate the source of the problem. Hence, steamboats were banned from British canals. 
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These advantages could be realized for an addi tional expenditure of as little as £50,000 for as long as the depth of the navigation remained the same, the amount of damning and embanking required to construct the Rideau Canal would not change appreciably nor would the thickness of the lock wall masonry estimated for the smaller scale of canal.
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Once the survey work on the Rideau was completed, By repor ted further that if steamboats were not used thereon, ves sels would have to rely on oar or sail to effect a passage as towpaths were impracticable for up to seventy miles where the banks consisted of either high rocky cliffswhich would be too costly to excavate -or low-lying flood plains and swamps which would require heavy embanking at a prohibitive expense. Furthermore, on the Rideau the canal cuts were being carried for the most part through solid rock which would pose no problem in operating the paddles of steamboats.
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In view of the compelling nature of By 1 s arguments, the Board of Ordnance decided to despatch a committee of Royal Engineers to Upper Canada to decide on the scale of lock to be built. The Kempt Committee reported in June 1828 that the critical consideration was the need.to secure a depen dable means of propulsion for military transport vessels. Although sails and sweeps might well suffice for commercial transport needs where two paths could not be constructed, this was not the case for war operations. Vessels could not tack against the wind on a canalized river, and relying on oars or awaiting a favourable wind would occasion unaccep table delays. Consequently, the committee concluded that the construction of locks of a sufficient size to enable steamboats to circulate through the Rideau Canal was impera tive. The committee, however, did not see the advantage of constructing the large lock proposed by By without a proportionably deep canal and correspondingly large locks on the other canals, which would be prohibitively expensive. Accordingly, they decided that the Rideau navigation should be built five feet deep with locks sufficiently large to pass the smallest of the steam towboats that had proved capable of operating on the open waters of the Ottawa River navigation. These sidewheelers were 108 feet long and thirty feet wide across the paddleboxes, with a four-foot draught, and their thirty-two HP engine, it was calculated, could easily tow two fully-laden Durham boats at a speed of four to five miles per hour in quiet water. Moreover, the com mittee noted there were more than enough Durham boats cur rently in use on the Saint Lawrence to provide ample trans port for military and naval stores in the event of war, and the Durham boats would be able to pass through the whole system from Montréal to Kingston independent of the Saint Lawrence without any recourse to transhipment. In the decade-or-more-long quest to determine how an alter native communications system to that in existence on the Saint Lawrence might be best developed and operated in the interior of Upper Canada, the British Ordnance Department had concentrated on determining what was the best medium as well as mode of transport. Whether roads, canals or rail ways were considered, the inquiry focussed on each medium of transport in terms of its feasibility as well as its con struction and maintenance costs, carrying capacity, the availability of the motive power required and its relative speed and ease of operation. Initially, the Ordnance De partment had intended to develop a bateaux navigation by way of the Ottawa-Rideau route employing thereon the French-Canadian bateaux, the prevalent mode of river trans port on the Saint Lawrence; but when the American Durham boat came into common use on major Canadian rivers, the pos sibility of employing these vessels in the military trans port system was investigated. When it became apparent that a canal through the Rideau corridor would be much more cost ly to construct than hitherto suspected, the Ordnance De partment -at the prompting of the Colonial Departmentimmediately turned to investigate the possibility of a rail way. Although the subsequent inquiry focussed on the feasi bility of constructing a railway in keeping with English standards, rather than the as-yet unproven invention of James George, the Canadian invention did initiate the in quiry into the railway alternative and railways were ulti mately rejected in large part because of their perceived unsuitability to the Canadian environment.
Where a steamboat canal was concerned, the Ordnance was slow to respond to the benefits realized through the early intro duction of this mode of transport onto Canadian river navi gations. However, this rejection was based on the British experience where all but insuperable difficulties had been encountered in attempting to operate steamboats on canals. Once Lieut. 
